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INTRODUCTION
As Americans continue to embrace the Internet as a tool for communi-
cations, business, and social interaction, a host of issues surrounding
privacy, data collection, and monetization of content remain both hotly de-
bated and increasingly urgent. In the early years of the commercial Internet,
many websites-from Amazon to NYTimes.com to Craigslist-offered their
services and content for free. As a result, consumers became accustomed to
receiving free content, rather than having to pay individual websites or net-
works a subscription fee.1
Exploiting user data is a lucrative and effective method for websites to
earn money and avoid charging consumers. User data consists of infor-
mation that users provide to websites, information regarding a user's
browsing habits on a particular site, or both, and can reveal a great deal
about the user herself, from individual preferences to biographical infor-
mation to browsing history. This data can be sold or shared with third
parties, allowing advertisers to create more targeted advertisements for indi-
vidual users.
In some cases, there are broad social benefits to collecting user data. For
example, over the past few years, Google aggregated user search data to
track flu outbreaks. The site could even have reported some of these out-
breaks before the Center for Disease Control.' Yet collecting too much user
1. Indeed, when the New York Times announced that it would institute a "pay wall" by
restricting content to paid subscribers and allowing non-subscribers a limited number of arti-
cles to read per month, reactions were mixed, though the pay wall was ultimately deemed
successful. Don Reisinger, NYTimes: Consumer Pay Wall Response "Positive," CNET (July
21, 2011, 6:41 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13506_3-20081371-17/nytimes-consumer-
pay-wall-response-positive/.
2. Miguel Helft, Google Uses Searches to Track Flu's Spread, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
2008, at Al.
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data could be disturbing to website users. When the extent of data collection
is revealed, users' emotions have escalated to anger and frustration.3
A website's privacy policy should, in theory, make it clear to a website's
users if and how their data is being collected, and for what purposes. These
privacy policies, however, can be quite long and difficult for an average user
to comprehend. Moreover, their claims may not be accurate, and users may
have no way of knowing what data is collected and what exactly happens to
or with their data. The federal government-specifically the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"), an independent agency charged with protecting
American consumers-has played a crucial role in regulating the collection
and use of consumer data online. But in a rapidly changing online ecosys-
tem, government regulation may not be sufficient to protect consumers.
This Note examines website privacy policies in the context of FTC reg-
ulation. The relevant portion of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), uses the following language to define the scope of
the agency's regulatory authority: "Unfair methods of competition in or af-
fecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." Specifically, this Note analyzes
the FTC's power to regulate unfair practices (referred to as the FTC's "un-
fairness power") granted by Section 5, and also discusses the deception
prong of Section 5, which allows the agency to regulate and prevent decep-
tive commercial acts by businesses.
This Note argues that, given the prevalence of confusing and obscure
data collection practices, the FTC must aggressively interpret its statutory
authority in order to effectively protect consumers. By examining three
prominent websites-Google, Facebook, and Twitter-this Note demon-
strates how some of their practices might be considered unfair toward
consumers, in light of the statements set out in their privacy policies. How-
ever, the FTC would need to reformulate its policy choices concerning
unfairness and pursue a more aggressive regulatory strategy in order to ad-
dress those potentially unfair practices.
Part I of this Note examines the recent history of the FTC and its en-
forcement powers, including a close analysis of the FTC's policy statements
on deception and unfairness and their future implications. In Part II, this
Note explores the procedures and challenges of applying the legal standards
in deception and unfairness cases. In Part III, the focus turns to Google and
its recent decision to create a cross-platform privacy policy. Facebook, the
subject of Part IV, remains in the news for privacy violations, despite a his-
tory of controversies concerning its handling of user data. Finally, Part V
3. See, e.g., Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino- DeVries, Apple, Google Collect User
Data, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487039837
04576277101723453610.html (discussing user "furor" following the revelation that iPhones
had been tracking and recording where users went).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2011).
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discusses Twitter and the ramifications of the FTC's settlement with the mi-
croblogging service-the first case brought against a major social network.
In conclusion, this Note examines the likelihood of change in the FTC's
approach, the recent attention given toward consumer online privacy by the
White House and the FTC, and possible trends in privacy regulation in the
near future.
I. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
AND ITS ENFORCEMENT POWERS
A. The Background and Structure
of the Federal Trade Commission
The FTC was established in 1914 by the Federal Trade Commission
Act.' The agency is tasked with preventing unfair methods of competition,
as well as unfair or deceptive trade practices.6 Through the powers granted
to it by the FTC Act, the FTC enforces two distinct areas of law: antitrust
and consumer protection.'
The FTC consists of three Bureaus: the Bureau of Competition ("BC"),
which enforces antitrust regulations; the Bureau of Consumer Protection
("BCP"), which enforces consumer protection regulations; and the Bureau
of Economics ("BE"), which conducts economic analyses.' BCP, the rele-
vant FTC Bureau for this Note, consists of seven subdivisions: Advertising
Practices, Marketing Practices, Financial Practices, Privacy and Identity
Protection, Planning and Information, Consumer and Business Education,
and Enforcement.9
The Division of Privacy and Identity Protection ("DPIP")-BCP's new-
est division-focuses on privacy issues, credit reporting, identity theft, and
information security.' 0 In addition to enforcing the FTC Act, it also sanc-
tions businesses for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act." DPIP serves as the federal government's sole
regulator for online privacy issues and practices and has brought several
5. Id. § 41.
6. Id. § 45(a)(2).
7. About the Federal Trade Commission, FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/
ftc/about.shtm (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
8. FTC Bureau of Competition, FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/
index.shtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2012); FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection, FED. TRADE
COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2012); FTC Bureau of Eco-
nomics, FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/be/index.shtmi (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
9. About the Bureau of Consumer Protection, FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://
www.ftc.gov/bcp/about.shtm (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
10. FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection-Division of Privacy and Identity Protection,
FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/bcppip.shtm (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
11. Id.
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high-profile enforcement actions against websites and online service provid-
ers.
In November 2011, DPIP announced a settlement with the popular so-
cial network site Facebook concerning its deceptive privacy policies; the
settlement was made final in August 2012.12 The complaint alleged eight
counts, including deceptive privacy settings, unfair and deceptive privacy
changes, undisclosed dissemination of user information with third-party
advertisers, a deceptive "Verified Apps" program, and dissemination of
user photos and videos.' 3 The settlement with Facebook followed other
highly publicized FTC cases brought against online sites such as Google
and Twitter.14
This Section begins by discussing policy statements dating from the
early 1980s, which form the foundation of the FTC's current interpretation
of its enforcement powers under Section 5. It will then proceed to analyze
the interpretation of the FTC's two main enforcement powers-commonly
referred to as "unfairness" and "deception"-since the policy statements
were published.
B. The Policy Statements: Unfairness and Deception
1. Background
The FTC's enforcement powers derive from Section 5 of the FTC Act,
15 U.S.C. § 45.15 The relevant language reads:
(a) Declaration of unlawfulness; power to prohibit unfair practices;
inapplicability to foreign trade.
(1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce, are hereby declared unlawful.
(2) The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent
persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair
12. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Facebook Settles FTC Charges (Nov. 29,
2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/201 I/I l/privacysettlement.shtm; Press Release,
Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Approves Final Settlement with Facebook (Aug. 10, 2012), availa-
ble at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/08/facebook.shtm.
13. Facebook, Inc., Docket No. C-4365, File No. 092-3184 (Fed. Trade Comm'n July
27, 2012) (complaint), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923184/111129facebookcmpt.pdf.
14. Google, Inc., Docket No. C-4336, File No. 102-3136 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Oct. 13,
2011) (agreement containing consent order), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023136/
110330googlebuzzagreeorder.pdf; Twitter, Inc., Docket No. C-4316, File No. 092-3093 (Fed.
Trade Comm'n Mar. 2, 2011) (decision and order), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/
0923093/110311 twitterdo.pdf.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2011).
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methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.16
For the first fifty years of its existence, the FTC's enforcement of Sec-
tion 5 varied widely. From the late 1960s through the early 1980s, a very
public and contentious debate played out in Washington, with the policy
statements serving as the final volley.
In 1969, Ralph Nader spearheaded a project criticizing the work of the
FTC. Nader pulled no punches in referring to the FTC as the "little old
lady of Pennsylvania Avenue . . . manipulated by the agents of commercial
predators, impervious to governmental and citizen monitoring."17 The
American Bar Association also published a report documenting the short-
comings of the FTC and contemplated the dissolution of the agency due to
its ineffectiveness." In response to these criticisms, President Richard
Nixon appointed Caspar Weinberger as the Chairman of the FTC with the
explicit goal of improving the FTC's reputation.19
In 1975, Congress passed the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, which
gave the FTC explicit rulemaking authority.20 After the election of President
Jimmy Carter in 1976, Michael Pertschuk was appointed Chair of the
FTC.21 Under Pertschuk, the FTC created several new rules pursuant to its
authority under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.22 The FTC's unprece-
dented vigorous enforcement led to a backlash from businesses that did not
respond well to increased government oversight and regulation. 23 As a re-
sult, Congress cut the FTC's appropriations and nearly shut the agency's
doors in 1980.24 Eventually, in order to combat accusations of ad hoc and
unsystematic enforcement, the Commission moved to an economic analysis
model, conducted by the Bureau of Economics, to determine how to best
enforce the provisions of the FTC Act.25 Policy statements on unfairness and
deception were borne out of this tense political context, explicitly designed
by the FTC to limit its own authority in order to combat future accusations
that the agency regulated too aggressively and avoid another potential disso-
lution of the agency itself.
16. Id.
17. Ralph Nader, preface to EDWARD F. Cox, ROBERT C. FELLMETH & JOHN E.
SCHULz, THE NADER REPORT ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION vii (Richard W. Baron
ed.) (1969).
18. AM. BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE A.B.A. COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION (1969).
19. See, e.g., William J. Baer, Where to from Here: Reflection on the Recent Saga of
the Federal Trade Commission, 39 OKLA. L. REv. 51, 52 (1986).
20. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (2011).
21. See, e.g., Commissioners and Chairmen of the Federal Trade Commission, FED.
TRADE COMM'N (Oct. 2010), http://ftc.gov/ftc/history/commisionerchartlegal201O.pdf.
22. Baer, supra note 19, at 53.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 54.
25. Id. at 55.
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2. The Policy Statements
The first policy statement, dated December 17, 1980, addressed the
FTC's unfairness power.26 The Unfairness Policy Statement was sent to Sen-
ators Wendell Ford and John Danforth in response to a letter they had
written to the FTC requesting its views on how to interpret "consumer un-
fairness." 27 In the Statement, the FTC relied upon the Supreme Court's
holding in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 28 which used three factors to
evaluate whether a practice was unfair: (1) whether the practice injures con-
sumers, (2) whether it violates established public policy, and (3) whether it
is unethical or unscrupulous. 29
In evaluating the first factor, the FTC required the injury to meet three
requirements: (1) the injury must be substantial, (2) other consumer or com-
petitive benefits must not outweigh it, and (3) it must not be an injury that
consumers could have substantially avoided. 30 Regarding the second factor,
the FTC looks toward statutes, common law, industry practice, and public
policy to evaluate "the validity and strength of the evidence of consumer
injury.""1 If the FTC were to rely heavily upon public policy to buttress an
unfairness claim, the policy would need to be clearly defined and well estab-
lished.32 The FTC determined that because the third factor was largely
duplicative of the first two, it would use only the first two factors as a basis
for an unfairness finding.33
FTC officials created the second policy statement-the Deception Policy
Statement-nearly three years later, in October 1983. This policy statement
also took the form of a letter to Congress-this time, as a response to Repre-
sentative John Dingell.3 1 In the Deception Policy Statement, the FTC observed
that in all deception cases, "there must be a representation, omission, or prac-
tice that is likely to mislead the consumer."35 Such a representation, omission,
or practice must be material to a consumer acting reasonably under the cir-
cumstances.36 In establishing whether a representation, omission, or practice
26. Letter from Michael Pertschuk, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, et al., to Sen.
Wendell H. Ford & Sen. John C. Danforth (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in Int'l Harvester Co.,
104 F.T.C. 949 app. (1984), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm
[hereinafter Unfairness Policy Statement].
27. Id.
28. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
29. See Unfairness Policy Statement, supra note 26.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Letter from James C. Miller I, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, et al., to Rep.
John D. Dingell (Oct. 14, 1983), reprinted in Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110
app. (1984), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm [hereinafter
Deception Policy Statement].
35. Id.
36. Id.
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is likely to mislead the consumer, the FTC looks to both express and implied
claims.3 7 In the case of implied claims, the FTC examines the representation
itself and looks to extrinsic evidence to evaluate the implied claim.38 The
FTC also considers cases involving the omission of material information as
a deceptive practice. 39
Concerning the consumer's reasonableness, the FTC examines the en-
tire advertisement, transaction, or course of dealing in order to evaluate a
deceptiveness claim.40 "Puffed" claims, as well as claims that are obviously
exaggerated, do not meet this standard. 4 1 In general, the FTC will consider
many factors in determining an "ordinary consumer's" reaction. These in-
clude the clarity of the representation, whether qualifying information is
conspicuous, the importance of any omitted information (and whether such
information is available elsewhere), and the familiarity of the public with
the product or service. 42
Regarding the materiality of the representation, omission, or practice,
the FTC first attempts to determine whether the representation in question is
likely to affect a consumer's choice or conduct concerning a product.43 Ex-
press claims-claims that the seller explicitly makes to consumers-are
presumptively material. Claims that would be important to a reasonable
consumer, such as health or safety claims, are also presumptively material."
Absent these elements, the FTC may look to other evidence in order to de-
termine whether consumers will consider a claim or omission material.45
Both policy statements were appended to FTC cases: the Unfairness
Policy Statement to International Harvester Co.,46 and the Deception Policy
Statement to Cliffdale Associates, Inc. 47 In 1994, Congress codified the Un-
fairness Policy Statement into law at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).48 Although the
Deception Policy Statement was not codified into statutory law, it has been
adopted by multiple courts, making it persuasive, if not binding, authority in
future cases. 49
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 app. (1984)
47. Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 app. (1984).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2011); see also Stephen Calkins, FTC Unfairness: An Essay, 46
WAYNE L. REV. 1935, 1955-60 (2000).
49. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13371 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 1988).
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3. Implications of the Policy Statements
Though the FTC severely circumscribed its ability to litigate at the level
it had following passage of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act by creating
the policy statements, the FTC also arguably saved itself from defunding
and irrelevance. Because the policy statements codified the FTC's approach
and analysis in unfairness and deception cases, they obviated charges from
critics that the agency was inconsistent and unpredictable in bringing cases
against businesses. Both statements set out a clear rubric of how the FTC
conceives of unfairness and deception and what elements are required for a
successful claim.
Courts have consistently relied upon the policy statements for decades,
ensuring that they remain a central part of current F[C Act litigation. In the
immediate future, political pressure (either from politicians or non-profit
organizations) seems to be the sole way of persuading the agency to take a
more aggressive role in pursuing commercial organizations that violate the
unfairness and deception prongs of the FTC Act. Given the implications that
the recent financial crisis has had on government funding, it seems unlikely
that the FTC's role will expand drastically. Unless and until consumer frus-
tration reaches the levels documented by Ralph Nader and the ABA in the
late 1960s, the FTC's current approach to enforcement via the policy state-
ments will likely remain stable.
II. APPLYING THE STANDARDS IN DECEPTION AND UNFAIRNESS CASES
A. Deception Cases
Deception remains the most commonly used prong of the FTC Act. 0
This is likely because of its relative clarity compared to unfairness-it is
easier to identify a discrete example of a deceptive practice that misleads
consumers than one that is unfair to consumers (and not offset by a consum-
er benefit). Indeed, in the years since the Deception Policy Statement's
publication, the FTC has chosen to use deception rather than unfairness as
the basis for its litigation in most cases."
To evaluate the existence of a deceptive trade act or practice, courts
generally use the standard articulated in the Deception Policy Statement:
"namely, that a practice falls within [the prohibition on deception] (1) if it is
likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances
50. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The FTC's Consumer Protection During the Miller
Years: Lessons for Administrative Agency Structure and Operation, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 371,
396 (1997).
51. Id.
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(2) in a way that is material."5 2 This language is fairly constant throughout
recent decisions, suggesting that the deceptiveness doctrine has reached a
state of equilibrium. The broad acceptance by courts of what constitutes a
colorable deceptiveness claim rebuts the assertions that the FTC's enforce-
ment agenda is inconsistent or unpredictable. That may indicate why
litigation under the deception prong remains the agency's weapon of choice.
The appeal of this approach to regulating commercial malfeasance is
obvious. The standard has two discrete elements that the agency can evalu-
ate with relative ease. The specific requirements for a deceptiveness case
discuss a "reasonable person" and materiality, which are well-established
standards throughout the common law. By contrast, the unfairness analysis
(as discussed below) uses a more complicated balancing test. Compared to
the unfairness test, the deception test serves as a sharper tool to use in evalu-
ating specific cases due to its clearer standards and the larger body of
relevant case law.
B. Unfairness Cases
In unfairness cases, the standard from Section 5 of the FTC Act con-
trols: "an unfair practice or act is one that 'causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by con-
sumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition."'53 The FIC must therefore demonstrate three
criteria, as opposed to only two under the deception standard. Moreover, the
unfairness criteria are arguably more difficult to satisfy, since companies can
defeat a charge of unfairness by either (1) giving consumers an opportunity
to avoid the injury or (2) offsetting it with other benefits.
Stephen Calkins, former General Counsel of the FTC, argues that both
the Unfairness Policy Statement and the underlying standards are unhelpful
to the FTC and to businesses. 54 During the fourteen years between the pub-
lication of the Unfairness Policy Statement and its incorporation into the
FTC Act, the FTC stated that it had relied upon the Unfairness Policy
Statement in only sixteen cases.55 Calkins notes that the FTC undercounted
and that it also relied upon the test articulated in the Unfairness Policy
Statement in several trade regulation rules and ten additional consent orders,
but that the number was still small.56 Given the agency's infrequent use of
the unfairness prong to regulate businesses, the FTC was perhaps demon-
52. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Cyberspace.com, 453 F.3d 1196, 1199-1200
(9th Cir. 2006); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Med. Billers Network, 543 F. Supp 2d 283, 303
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
53. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Neovi, Inc., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 12592, *7-8 (9th Cir.
Mar. 4, 2010).
54. Calkins, supra note 48, at 1937.
55. Id. at 1958.
56. Id. at 1958-60.
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strating its lack of commitment to using unfairness as a regulatory tool. Up-
on surveying the muddied landscape of unfairness, Calkins argues for
increased administrative adjudication to clarify the unfairness standard." He
also advocates for increased attention to the cost/benefit analysis (as applied
to consumers) prescribed by the Unfairness Policy Statement, and less ad-
herence to consumer injury.58
Calkins portrays the unfairness power not as a flexible tool, but as a
fuzzy and indistinct doctrine.59 As he observes, the language of the FTC Act
was intentionally vague in order to allow judicial decisions to further clarify
and shape the meanings of deception and unfairness.60 Whether the relevant
case law has actually provided such clarity is, of course, debatable. But by
examining the recent judicial decisions on unfairness more closely, one may
find that possible applications of the unfairness standard in the online space
become clearer. In fact, an unfairness claim is demonstrably more useful
against websites than a deception claim would be. Websites make material
claims to users by using terms of service and privacy policies, and relying
upon the deception prong in order to regulate websites would require a
"gotcha" moment, in which the website would inadvertently or negligently
misrepresent its practices to consumers. By contrast, using the unfairness
prong would more proactively regulate the core of website practices, rather
than waiting for providers to make a mistake.
C. Recent Tracking in Sears Holdings and Its Implications
The recent settlement in the Sears Holdings case demonstrates the
FTC's renewed commitment to increasing consumers' awareness of data
collection.61 The FTC did not use the unfairness prong in Sears Holdings;
instead, it relied upon the deception prong.62 Using the deception prong may
indicate a more conservative approach to regulating data collection, or it
might merely indicate that the deception prong was a better fit in this case.
Either way, Sears Holdings indicates that the FTC considers data collection
to be well within its power to regulate under the FTC Act.
57. Id. at 1989. Of course, any increased agency action would either require an increase
in resources or a reduction in other agency actions or practices. Whether the agency is even
able to increase its regulatory agenda, given the paucity of government resources in the cur-
rent political environment, is certainly up for debate.
58. Id. at 1990-91.
59. Id. at 1989.
60. Id. at 1949.
61. Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., Docket No. C-4264, File No. 0823099 (Fed. Trade
Comm'n Sept. 9, 2009) (decision and order), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist
0823099/090604searsdo.pdf.
62. See Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., Docket No. C-4264, File No. 0823099 (Fed.
Trade Comm'n June 4, 2009) (complaint), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823099/
090604searscmpt.pdf.
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In 2009, the FTC settled a complaint with Sears Holdings Management
Corporation after alleging that the company disseminated a software pro-
gram to consumers that tracked nearly all of the consumers' Internet traffic
and behavior, presumably to sell the aggregated data to third-party data bro-
kers who sought to monetize online consumer behavior.63 Consumers
received ten dollars for joining the service but lacked awareness of the ex-
tent to which Sears Holdings subsequently collected their data.6 While
Sears Holdings stated that its software would track "online browsing," the
company did not disclose that the application would track nearly all of a
user's Internet behavior.6 1
The FTC alleged that these actions constituted deceptive behavior under
Section 5.66 Sears Holdings' practices were material to consumers' decisions
in selecting to install the software, but the company did not disclose the
facts to consumers in its Privacy Statement and User License Agreement
("PSULA").67 The PSULA instead stated that the software would track con-
sumers' "online browsing," but did not state the actual extent of such
tracking. The FTC alleged that the statements in the PSULA would not indi-
cate to a reasonable consumer that Sears Holdings tracked nearly all of her
online behavior." Moreover, there was no visible indication to consumers
that the program was constantly tracking their usage. Given these failures,
the FTC alleged that Sears Holdings' practices were deceptive. The final
settlement in Sears Holdings required the company to disclose to users ex-
actly what data was being collected, how it was being used, and whether it
was being turned over to third parties. 69 It also required Sears Holdings to
delete all user data that it had previously collected. 70
This case illustrates the primary considerations that the FTC has in
mind when investigating Internet data collection cases: disclosure from
businesses, the extent of data collection, third-party communication, and
data retention. These considerations, as well as the general privacy claims
and practices that websites communicate to users, are critical in every FTC
investigation and enforcement action.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 3-4.
65. Id. at 5. The complaint alleged that the software tracked almost all Internet behav-
ior, including information transmitted between the computer and websites. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Approves Final Consent Order Requiring
Sears to Disclose the Installation of Tracking Software Placed on Consumers' Computers;
FTC Approves Final Consent Order in Matter Concerning Enhanced Vision Systems, Inc.
(Sept. 9, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/09/sears.shtm.
70. Id.
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III. GOOGLE: CROSS-PLATFORM PRIVACY POLICIES
AND THE ALLURE OF DATA COLLECTION
A. Traffic, Money, and "Don't Be Evil"
As the world's most-used search engine and leading digital advertising
services company, Google has a great deal of information about consumers
and knows how to successfully advertise products and services to them. 7 1
Moreover, Google's many other products have become an indispensable part
of consumer experiences online. Many individuals use Gmail, Google's mail
client, as their personal email account; YouTube, the video uploading and
streaming site that Google bought in 2006, ranks as the third most visited
domain worldwide and in the United States; 72 and various other Google ser-
vices, such as Blogger, Google Checkout, Google Analytics, and Google
Maps, have become vital to Internet users.
Because Google collects, collates, and retains so much raw data-both
regarding Internet search queries and its users' behavior within Google's
suite of sites-it ranks as one of the most highly valued Internet companies,
with a current stock price of over $650 per share. 73 Given that many Internet
companies have been unable to put pay walls into place to successfully
monetize their content, many Internet companies have chosen to imitate
Google's innovative data collection model to make money. User data can be
collected, aggregated, and sold to advertisers and other data collectors.
Companies can therefore target specific users in order to more accurately
and effectively advertise their goods and services. Google is extremely well-
positioned to collect and sell vast amounts of user data due to its high traffic
volume, ubiquity, and suite of products ranging from search to email to
blogging. While the company's unofficial motto is famously "Don't be evil,"
such absolutist catchphrases are minimally useful in an Internet ecosystem
full of shades of gray.74 As a publicly traded company, Google cannot inter-
pret "Don't be evil" as "don't make money" without betraying its
shareholders. With user data remaining a hot commodity, Google has taken
steps that, while not necessarily "evil," do not demonstrate a pure commit-
ment to "good." Google's own actions concerning its use of user data, while
71. See, e.g., KEN AULETTA, GOOGLED: THE END OF THE WORLD As WE KNOW IT
xi (2010).
72. Youtube.com Site Info, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/youtube.com (last
visited Oct. 4, 2012). Google is currently ranked number one within the United States. See
Google.com Site Info, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/google.com (last visited Oct. 18,
2012).
73. GOOG: Summary for Google Inc., YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/
q?s=GOOG (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
74. See, e.g., Mat Honan, Google's Broken Promise: The End of "Don't Be Evil",
GIZMODO (Jan. 24, 2012, 5:41 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5878987/its-official-google-is-
evil-now.
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valuable from a business standpoint, are sufficiently opaque to consumers to
warrant FTC examination.
B. Privacy Run-Ins and Government Concerns
Given its vast suite of products, Google inevitably encounters prob-
lems with privacy advocates and American regulators regarding apparent
and actual privacy violations. Three products have attracted a large amount
of public attention: Google Books, Google Buzz, and Google Maps.
Google Books, which Google uses to sell electronic books (or e-books)
directly to consumers, was at one point the great hope for digitizing a large
corpus of literary works." Google, seeking to enlarge its database of
scanned books, created high-definition electronic scans of books that were
under copyright but out of print. American copyright law does not require
that artistic works be registered in order to receive protection; therefore,
locating the rightsholders of protected, out-of-print materials can be diffi-
cult. 6 Google's solution was to scan entire books but to display only a small
portion; the company intended to rely upon a fair use defense to forestall
any copyright infringement claims. 7 However, objections from authors and
the government in a variety of legal areas-from copyright to antitrust to
privacy-have greatly altered the project from its initially imagined form.7 1
One of the major concerns surrounding Google Books was reader priva-
cy. Google had not committed to incorporating privacy protections within
the project akin to the levels granted to readers who buy books from brick-
and-mortar bookstores and libraries. Librarians have traditionally been
strong proponents of reader privacy, as have bookstore owners, and courts
have upheld an individual's right to privacy in more traditional reading
spaces.7 1 However, Google's proposed privacy protections-which did not
extend beyond its baseline privacy policy-did not rise to the level of tradi-
tional reader privacy protections." Google appeared to be more concerned
75. Pamela Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyberspace,
94 MINN. L. REV. 1308, 1314 (2010).
76. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2011).
77. Samuelson, supra note 75, at 1314 n.32. Fair use is a statutory affirmative defense
available to alleged infringers. In a copyright infringement case, the trier of fact will look to
the purpose and character of the allegedly infringing use, the nature of the copyrighted work,
the amount used compared to the original work, and the effect upon the market, in order to
determine if the alleged infringer can rely upon fair use as a defense to infringement. 17
U.S.C. § 107 (2011).
78. For an excellent overview of objections to Google Books, see Samuelson, supra
note 75 at 1326-58.
79. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Kramerbooks & Afterwords Inc., 26 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1599 (D.D.C. 1998); Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044,
1059 (Colo. 2002).
80. Samuelson, supra note 75, at 1347. In Tattered Cover, the court upheld the
bookstore's right to resist subpoenas requiring the store to divulge readers' buying habits as an
invasion of privacy. Tattered Cover, 44 P.3d at 1047; see also Kramerbooks, 26 Media L.
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with its commercial bottom line than with allowing users to feel free to
browse and purchase books while maintaining their privacy.
While privacy objections surrounding Google Books remain abstract
given that the product has not been fully implemented, other privacy issues
involving Google products have directly affected consumers. Google Buzz,
one of the company's least successful products, created a minor firestorm
upon its automatic introduction to all Gmail users in February 2010. When it
launched, Google Buzz immediately broadcasted the contacts that each user
most frequently communicated with to other users." In one prominent case,
a blogger who wrote about violence against women feared for her own safe-
ty from antagonistic followers and her abusive ex-husband.82 Such concerns
eventually led to an FTC settlement,83 which specified that Google had used
deceptive practices in its launch of Google Buzz and that it would agree to
refrain from future privacy misrepresentations, launch a comprehensive pri-
vacy program, and consent to independent privacy audits for twenty years.84
Google eventually closed Buzz and moved its social networking platforms
to Google Plus, a product it launched in 2011 to compete with Facebook.81
Later in 2010, German privacy authorities discovered that Google vehi-
cles that had been mapping city streets for its Google Maps project had also
been collecting data on personal wireless networks and transfers therein."
Dubbed Google "Spyfi" due to Google's apparent surveillance of Wifi net-
works, the controversy demonstrated to some critics that Google has "a
Rep. (BNA) at 1600. Yet Google was not willing to match that level of privacy. Google
Books instead would adopt the general Google privacy policy, allowing Google to track users'
purchase history, browsing history, and past and present actions using the service, and cross-
reference those actions with other Google products. See Samuelson, supra note 75, at 1347.
This level of tracking is far in excess of the abilities of a traditional bookstore to monitor its
customers, and if Google Books had been implemented in the form proposed by Google in the
settlement, readers would have been monitored far in excess of the privacy a bookstore
browser would normally have. Id. at 1346 n.190.
81. Miguel Helft, Critics Say Google Invades Privacy with New Service, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 12, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/13/technology/internet/13google.html.
82. Id.
83. Google Inc., Docket No. C-4336, File No. 102-3136 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Oct. 13,
2011) (order), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023136/111024googlebuzzdo.pdf.
84. See id.; Press Release Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Prac-
tices in Google's Rollout of its Buzz Social Network (Mar. 30, 2011), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/03/google.shtm.
85. See Claire Cain Miller, Another Try by Google to Take on Facebook, N.Y. TIMES
(June 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/technology/29google.htmlpagewanted
=all.
86. David Kravets, An Intentional Mistake: The Anatomy of Google's Wi-Fi Sniffing
Debacle, WIRED (May 02, 2012, 7:18 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/05/
google-wifi-fcc-investigation/; David Sarno, Lawmakers Grill Google's Eric Schmidt on
"Spy-Fi" Privacy Issue, L.A. TIMES (May 26, 2010), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
technology/2010/05/legislators-grill-google-eric-schmidt-on-spyfi-privacy-issue.html.
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bunch of engineers who push the envelope and gather as much information
as they can and don't think about the ramifications of that." 7
While Google has avoided major privacy controversies in the last year,
it still attracts attention when consumers and critics perceive its products as
overreaching. In February 2012, various news outlets reported that Google
and other advertisers had circumvented settings on Safari-Apple's web
browser and the most popular mobile browser-allowing the company to
track users' web browsing."8 The FTC declined to comment on whether it
would look into this privacy violation as part of its overall settlement with
Google concerning Google Buzz. The terms of that settlement would cer-
tainly permit the agency to do so, however, as Google had pledged to enact a
comprehensive privacy regime as a condition of the settlement. 9 As many of
the agency's proceedings are not disclosed to the public, consumers will
almost certainly remain unaware of how much the FTC polices Google's
activities and whether the agency's current enforcement strategy responds to
each fresh privacy stumble. Increased disclosure from the agency regarding
the results of Google's privacy audits would alleviate this concern.
C. A Change in Privacy-Or Not?
In January 2012, Google announced an update to its privacy policy on
its official blog. 90 Google characterized its new policy as a streamlining of
over seventy privacy documents in order to better integrate the vast portfolio
of Google products.91 Some privacy policies would remain independent of
the "master policy," but in general, the changes would better accommodate
regulatory requests for simplicity while preserving user independence. 92
One of the most notable changes was the removal of the "silo-ing" of user
data among Google products. Previously, YouTube user data had been kept
separate from Google search data, but under the new terms, Google would
analyze all user data together.93
87. Maggie Shiels, Google Admits Wi-Fi Data Collection Blunder, BBC (May 15,
2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/86841 10.stm.
88. Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Google's iPhone Tracking, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 17, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/articleemail/SBl0001424052970204880404577
225380456599176-IMyQjAxMTAyMDEwNjExNDYyWj.html.
89. Google Inc., Docket No. C-4336, File No. 102-3136 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Oct. 13,
2011) (order), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023136/111024googlebuzzdo.pdf.
90. Alma Whitten, Updating Our Privacy Policies and Terms of Service, GOOGLE
OFFICIAL BLOG (Jan. 24, 2012), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/updating-our-
privacy-policies-and-terms.html.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Rainey Reitman, What Actually Changed in Google's Privacy Policy, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. DEEPLINKS BLOG (Feb. 1, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/02/
what-actually-changed-google%27s-privacy-policy [hereinafter EFF].
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Many privacy advocates and regulators were concerned by Google's new
cross-platform privacy policy.94 In part, this seems due to the company's
mixed track record on privacy. Even assuming that Google had expressed a
greater willingness to respect user privacy following the Google Buzz consent
decree, the recent Safari incident demonstrates that Google has been unable to
stay out of the news regarding perceived privacy violations. As a result,
Google's changes and assurances have been met with a healthy dose of
skepticism. 95
Following a request from American legislators, Google elaborated on
how its privacy policy actually changed as a result of the streamlining. 6 The
Electronic Frontier Foundation summarized the changes as allowing Google
to use data collected from YouTube and search history in other
Google products.97 Google explained that, for instance, users who searched
for recipes on Google would receive cooking videos as suggestions while
browsing YouTube. 98 If Google users wanted to preserve the status quo and
prevent this commingling of data, however, they would have to create sep-
arate accounts for different Google products.99
From the perspective of unfairness enforcement under the FTC Act,
there are a number of issues that might point to the possibility of an un-
fairness claim. As discussed in Part II.B, unfairness traditionally invokes
the standard codified in 15 U.S.C § 45(n), requiring an act or practice that
(1) causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers (2) which is
not reasonably avoidable by consumers or (3) outweighed by other bene-
fits.1 o Meeting the three-factor test in this case seems difficult, though
not impossible.
Substantial injury would require demonstrating that Google's new pri-
vacy policy adversely affected consumers, which is not an obvious finding
in the online ecosystem. In this context, meeting this factor would likely
require a data breach causing the release of identifiable un-anonymized user
data; mere commingling of data across services would probably not qualify
94. See, e.g., id.; Rob Waugh, Unfair and Unwise: Google Brings in New Privacy Poli-
cyfor Two Billion Users-Despite EU Concerns It May Be Illegal, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Mar.
1, 2012, 7:28 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2108564/Google-privacy-
policy-changes-Global-outcry-policy-ignored.html.
95. See, e.g., EFF, supra note 93.
96. See Letter from Pablo Chavez, Dir. of Pub. Policy, Google, Inc., to Members of
Congress, Jan. 30, 2012, available at https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid-explorer&
chrome=true&srcid=OBwxyRPFduTN2NTZhNDkZDgtMmM3MCOOYjcOLTg4YTMtYTM3
NDkxZTE20WRi&hl=enUS&pli=1.
97. See EFF, supra note 93.
98. See Letter from Pablo Chavez to Members of Congress, supra note 96, at 3.
99. See EFF, supra note 93.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2011).
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as a substantial injury.10' Thus, absent financial harm or damage to personal
property like computers, it seems unlikely that most websites' privacy poli-
cies will meet this standard.
By comparison, meeting the other two factors of the unfairness test
seems markedly easier. Consumers cannot easily avoid the changes in
Google's policy for many reasons. First, the new policy contains no
opt-out provisions. Customers were not able to prevent the new policy
from going into effect, and they could only work to disassociate their user
data before the new policy was implemented.'02 Moreover, users cannot
easily switch to other products in order to avoid the changes, given
Google's entrenchment within the Internet landscape. The high transaction
costs involved in switching from Google products and the premier status
of these products means that Google users have a strong degree of loyalty
to the company's services.'0
The final aspect of the unfairness balancing test-whether the benefits
of the practice outweigh any substantial injury to consumers-also skews
against Google. While Google may claim that its new policies benefit
users, this is not readily apparent. Some users may find suggested cooking
videos, as in Google's hypothetical, surprising or even unsettling.'" In
addition, Google's track record of taking unilateral action to benefit users
received heavy criticism in the Google Buzz case. It is unclear how
exactly Google's new practices benefit users; while the new wording of the
101. The classic definition of "substantial injury" is an act or practice that either does
"small harm to a large number of people, or. . . raises a significant risk of concrete harm."
Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 767 F.2d 957, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
102. See, e.g., Eva Galperin, How to Remove Your YouTube Viewing and Search History
Before Google's New Privacy Policy Takes Effect, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. DEEPLINKS BLOG
(Feb. 23, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/02/how-remove-your-youtube-viewing-
and-search-history-googles-new-privacy-policy; Eva Galperin, How to Remove Your Google
Search History Before Google's New Privacy Policy Takes Effect, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.
DEEPLINKS BLOG (Feb. 21, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/02/how-remove-your-
google-search-history-googles-new-privacy-policy-takes-effect.
103. See, e.g., Patrick Stafford, Google Users Show Most Loyalty, SMART COMPANY
(Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.smartcompany.com.au/intemet/20090818-google-users-show-
most-loyalty.html.
104. See discussion supra note 96. In a letter to members of Congress, Google suggested
that the ability under the new privacy policy to suggest videos on a specific topic to users who
had searched for related topics would be beneficial to users. However, some users have com-
plained about Google's ability to assume that a user is looking for a specific result before the
user specifically requests that result, most notably in the area of Autocomplete. Autocomplete
automatically suggests results to Google users as they begin to type in a query to the search
engine, based on the most popular searches related to the first words of a search query. In one
notable case, Autocomplete suggested to users in Germany that they were trying to determine
if the former First Lady, Bettina Wulf, had been a prostitute or an escort, despite the fact that
there was never any plausible evidence that she actually had been either. See Nicholas Kulish,
As Google Fills in Blank, a German Cries Foul, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2012, at A4. Because
the presumption that Autocomplete suggested was inaccurate, it led to user frustration,
demonstrating that Google's predictive algorithms are not always welcome to users.
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privacy policy is arguably simpler (though not necessarily clearer to
consumers), the actual content does not provide any obvious benefits.
Without evidence of actual consumer harm, an unfairness claim against
Google concerning its new privacy policy would be difficult to substantiate.
Under the terms of the consent decree, the FTC likely has a lower eviden-
tiary burden than under a traditional FTC Act claim. But, given that Google
gave clear advance notice to its users and undertook the changes in part to
make the landscape easier to understand, it has arguably met the "compre-
hensive privacy program" standard of the consent decree. 0 Moreover,
Google's transparency concerning the changes (even if legislative action
proved necessary to obtain clarity) probably forestalls a successful decep-
tion claim under the FTC Act.
In August 2012, the FTC announced a proposed settlement with
Google for violations of the consent decree.' 06 The fine was the largest
penalty in history for violating an FTC order, 07 demonstrating the FTC's
commitment to protecting consumer privacy and existing consent
decrees, 08 as well as its awareness of criticisms that it was lax on privacy
protection and enforcement.'" The fine, however, does not specifically
allege that Google committed unfair or deceptive acts or practices, but rather
that the company violated the terms of the consent decree by making
misrepresentations-a term that points more toward deception than
unfairness, given the requirements of the two tests."o It remains to be seen
105. Specifically, the Google Buzz consent decree requires Google to "establish and
implement, and thereafter maintain, a comprehensive privacy program that is reasonably de-
signed to: (1) address privacy risks related to the development and management of new and
existing products and services for consumers, and (2) protect the privacy and confidentiality
of covered information." See Google Inc., Docket No. C-4336, File No. 102-3136 (Fed. Trade
Comm'n Oct. 13, 2011) (order), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023136/111024google
buzzdo.pdf.
106. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC
Charges it Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple's Safari Internet Browser
(Aug. 9, 2012), available at http://ftc.gov/opa/2012/08/google.shtm.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, F.T.C. Fines Google $22.5 Million for Safari Privacy
Violations, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Aug. 9, 2012, 1:03 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/08/09/f-t-c-fines-google-22-5-million-for-safari-privacy-violations/ (describing BCP
Director David Vladeck's comments regarding technology companies and their responsibili-
ties toward users).
109. In June 2012, Wired and ProPublica published an article criticizing the FTC for its
lack of funding and allegedly outdated approach to protecting consumers' privacy. See Peter
Maass, Your FTC Privacy Watchdogs: Low-Tech, Defensive, Toothless, WIRED (June 28,
2012, 6:30 A.M.), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/06/ftc-fail/all/. The article created a
flurry of controversy as the FTC responded to rebut what it saw as unfair implications, creat-
ing a "he said, she said" dynamic between the agency and ProPublica. See Correspondence
Between the FTC and ProPublica, PROPUBLICA (Jul. 6, 2012, 3:55 PM), http://
www.propublica.org/article/ftc-emails.
110. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note 106.
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what new cases or consent decree violations the FTC will bring against the
company, and for which actions.
D. Google at Home and Abroad
Google's change in its privacy policy, of course, may not be legally or
ethically wrong. Just because a company changes a privacy policy in order
to benefit its own data-collection practices, it is not necessarily acting un-
fairly under either an FTC definition or general consumer understanding.
Companies constantly enact changes for a variety of reasons. Yet Google's
prior conduct makes its recent changes surprising from a public relations
perspective. Despite the company's multiple high-profile privacy viola-
tions, it is unclear whether it has reformed. Indeed, it is hard to dispel the
perhaps cynical suspicion that Google's actions serve a commercial benefit
in a way that unfairly harms consumers. The Commission's August 2012
fine demonstrates, however, that government regulators are watching the
company closely.
Foreign authorities have also focused their attention on Google, in some
cases opening their own inquiries."11 In Europe, where privacy protections
are more stringent, authorities have gone so far as to suggest that Google's
new policy appears to violate European Union ("EU") law.1 2 The National
Commission for Computing and Liberties ("CNiL"), a French privacy agen-
cy, stated in a letter to Google CEO Larry Page that the lack of clarity
surrounding exactly how Google combined user data pointed to a possible
violation of the law."13
The FTC does not necessarily need to investigate a company merely
because foreign officials are conducting investigations, but the EU's iden-
tification of vagueness and obscurity in Google's explanations within the
new privacy policy suggests a need for further investigation on our own
shores." 4 While the FTC might be able to use its Google Buzz consent
Ill. Eric Pfanner, France Says Google Privacy Policy Likely Violates European Law,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 2012, at B9. In a letter to Google, France's privacy agency, Commission
Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertis, alleged that Google had violated the European
Directive on Data Protection by failing to disclose comprehensively what user data the com-
pany processed. See Letter from Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, President, Commission Nationale
de l'Informatique et des Libertds, to Larry Page, CEO, Google, Inc. (Feb. 27, 2012),
available at http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/en/CourierGoogle-CE121115_27-02-
2012-EN.pdf.
112. Pfanner, supra note 111. The EU law in question, commonly referred to as the Data
Protection Directive, Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC), has generally been
seen as more rigorously protecting consumer privacy than the patchwork of American laws.
See, e.g., Julia M. Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 471, 472 (2000).
113. Letter from Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin to Larry Page, supra note 111.
114. In October 2012, twenty-seven European data protection agencies wrote to Google
asking for a change in the privacy policy in order to make Google's actual data protection
practices clearer to users. The head of CNIL stated that, should Google fail to make appropri-
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decree as the basis for an investigation, other similar cases might lack such
justifications. Constraining the agency via the current unfairness test may be
shortsighted since foreign consumer protection agencies have no qualms
about investigating Google's behavior. Europe's investigation into
Google's practices demonstrates that American regulators should also
open similar inquiries, especially since it would be unfeasible for the web-
site to operate in drastically different ways in one country versus
another.'15 A unified international approach would avoid placing the bur-
den of creating country-specific sites by indicating what terms of service
would be generally appropriate to both American and European regulators.
Seeking harmonization in an international regulatory approach, preferably
via cooperation by international regulators, would ensure clearer expecta-
tions for users.
IV. FACEBOOK: CONNECTING "FRIENDS"
FROM COLLEGES TO THE WORLD
A. The Social Network
In just eight years, Facebook has become the most popular online social
network, ranking number one on Alexa's list of the most popular websites
globally and number two within the United States. 116 But in that time, the
site has become equally infamous for its privacy problems," 7 which remain
especially relevant as the site continues its partnerships with other media
and technology products such as the Washington Post, Spotify, and the
Guardian."' With more partnerships likely on the horizon, Facebook could
aggregate a vast amount of data on its users, from "Likes" to articles read to
ate changes, CNIL might file charges against Google. See Eric Pfanner & Kevin J. O'Brien,
Europe Presses Google to Change Privacy Policy, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 17, 2012, at B 1.
115. A classic illustration of this difficulty in tailoring a website for different markets
arose in the seminal case of Yahoo! v. LICRA. In that case, the International League against
Racism and Anti-Semitism filed suit against Yahoo! in France after sending a cease-and-desist
letter to Yahoo!'s California headquarters for violating French laws against the sale of Nazi
objects. Yahoo! claimed it could not comply with the French court's order requiring Yahoo!
to pay a fine of C100,000 per day if French nationals could access auction listings of items that
were prohibited for sale under French law. Ultimately, Yahoo! was not fined for any viola-
tions of the court orders restricting its listings in France, but neither LICRA nor its partner in
the suit, L'Union des Etudiants Juifs de France ("UEJF"), agreed to have the orders eliminat-
ed. See Yahoo! v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
116. Facebook.com Site Info, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/facebook.com (last
visited Oct. 21, 2012).
117. See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, Risk and Riches in User Data for Facebook, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2012, at Bl.
118. See Margot Kaminski, Reading Over Your Shoulder: Social Readers and Privacy
Law, 2 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 13 (2012).
183Fall 2012]
184 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
websites visited." 9 Moreover, Facebook came under criticism in 2011 for
tracking users even after they had left the social network.120
Because of its high level of personalization, Facebook's trove of user
data is arguably more valuable than Google's, such that an unexpected data
leak would be potentially more damaging. First, Facebook users actively
reveal their personal preferences on the site by adding "Likes"; posting
links, photos, and videos; identifying locations where they have "Checked
In"; and identifying their work and educational history. As a result, most
Facebook users create a version of themselves online that reflects their per-
sonal history and important aspects of their personality. This "Facebook
self' contains the exact kinds of data that marketers find so appealing-age,
educational status, family structure, geographic location, product prefer-
ences, political leanings, and content curation-while eliding aspects of a
personality that are not as commercially valuable (such as moral views,
doubts, or emotional patterns).12 1
Due to the high value of its data, Facebook has been able to remain a
free service by using advertising as its main source of revenue. 122 As adver-
tising becomes targeted toward individual users, the valuable user data that
Facebook retains allows advertisers to determine exactly which ads to send,
not only within but possibly outside the site.123 However, Facebook's poli-
cies on how it collects and manages user data have angered users and drawn
criticism from advocacy groups.124
B. From Criticism to Litigation: Beacon and
the 2011 FTC Settlement
One of the most prominent incidents concerning Facebook's privacy
practices came in November 2007 with the announcement of the ill-fated
119. For further discussion on the "Like" button, see infra note 121.
120. See Jeff Ward-Bailey, Facebook Tracking Now Under Federal Investigation,
CHRISTIAN Sc. MONITOR (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/Innovation/Horizons/
2011/1117/Facebook-tracking-now-under-federal-investigation.
121. The issue of "Like" buttons-where users can indicate their preference or support
for certain businesses, comments, images, and other Facebook content-has been a fraught
question. Recently, a district court held that Like buttons are not a form of First Amendment-
protected speech. See Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2012), appeal
docketed, No. 12-1671 (4th Cir. May 23, 2012). The increased use of Like buttons on
Facebook affiliate sites creates interesting questions regarding notice, disclosure, and the
privacy practices that apply to such buttons.
122. Emily Steel & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Big Brands Like Facebook, but They Don't Like
to Pay, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2011, at Al.
123. See, e.g., Sengupta, supra note 117.
124. See, e.g., Mark M. Jaycox & Rainey Reitman, Facebook's (In)Conspicuous Ab-
sence from the Do Not Track Discussions, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. DEEPLINKS BLOG (Mar.
15, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/03/facebooks-inconspicuous-absence-do-not-
track-discussions-when-individual.
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Facebook Beacon program. 125 Beacon was designed to send stories
about Facebook users' activities outside the Facebook site into Facebook
newsfeeds. For example, if a user bought a ticket on Fandango's website at
www.fandango.com, that user's friends would see a story about her purchase
on the main page of their Facebook account (currently known as the News
Feed). Users complained when Facebook announced the Beacon program, 126
leading to its eventual shut down two years later, in November 2009.127 The
program also became the subject of a class action lawsuit, Lane v. Facebook,
Inc., which eventually settled.128 In Lane, the plaintiffs alleged that Face-
book had violated several state and federal laws, including the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Video
Privacy Protection Act, California's Computer Crime Law, and the Califor-
nia Consumer Legal Remedies Act. 129 Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg
later admitted that the program was a "mistake." 30
Like Google, Facebook has been targeted by American regulators for its
privacy violations. In November 2011, the FTC announced a proposed set-
tlement with the site."' In the final August 2012 settlement, the FTC
prohibited Facebook from misrepresenting how it maintained the privacy or
security of user data, as it had in the Beacon incident. The FTC settlement
sent a clear signal to other online service providers to avoid Facebook's
many missteps. 13 2 Indeed, Zuckerberg admitted the failure of the Beacon
program in the settlement in an attempt to reassure Facebook users of the
company's commitment to privacy.133
125. See, e.g., Louise Story & Brad Stone, Facebook Retreats on Online Tracking, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2007, at Cl.
126. See id.
127. Chloe Albanesius, Facebook Partners with Nielsen, Ditches Beacon, PCMAG (Sept.
22, 2009, 1:07 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2353156,00.asp.
128. Mark Milian, What Facebook's Beacon Settlement Means for Those Involved, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 10 2009, 10:36 AM), http://1atimesblogs.1atimes.com/technology/2009/12/what-
is-facebook-beacon-settlement.html.
129. Complaint at 3-4, Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 2009 WL 3458198 (N.D. Cal Aug. 12,
2008) (No. 08-cv-3845 RS). Because the FTC Act does not allow for private rights of action,
the plaintiffs could not file a claim under the FTC Act. See, e.g., Days Inn of Am. Franchising,
Inc. v. Windham, 699 F. Supp. 1581 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
130. Mark Zuckerberg, Our Commitment to the Facebook Community, THE FACEBOOK
BLOG (Nov. 29, 2011, 9:39 AM), https://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=1015037
8701937131.
131. Facebook, Inc., Docket No. C-4365, File No. 092-3184 (Fed. Trade Comm'n 2011)
(agreement containing consent order), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923184/111129
facebookagree.pdf.
132. Facebook, Inc., Docket No. C-4365, File No. 092-3184 (July 9, 2012) (decision and
order), http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923184/120810facebookdo.pdf.
133. Zuckerberg, supra note 130.
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The FTC settlement was based primarily on deceptiveness claims under
Section 5 of the FTC Act, although the agency also relied in some respects
upon the unfairness prong.134 The settlement cited eight counts:
(1) Even when users restricted their information to a certain audi-
ence, third party apps that their friends used could gain access to
their information.
(2) Facebook claimed in 2009 that it was giving users more control
over their privacy, but information that users attempted to keep
private, such as their Friends List, was made public.
(3) Facebook changed some information from private to public,
thereby overriding users' choices and retroactively applying the
change to previously collected information, which was an
unfair act.
(4) Facebook apps could collect more information beyond what the
app "needed to work," despite Facebook's statement that apps
would only collect enough information to work properly.
(5) Facebook claimed that it would not share information with ad-
vertisers, but in some instances, when a user clicked on ads, that
user's UserlD was shared with advertisers.
(6) Despite creating a "Verified Apps" program designed to provide
certain apps and developers with a certification of good practic-
es, Facebook did not take additional steps when reviewing apps
for the program-even though developers paid between $175
and $375 for the stamp of approval.
(7) Facebook said that when users deactivated accounts, all the con-
tent they had uploaded to Facebook would be deleted; however,
the content that former users had uploaded could still be ac-
cessed by entering the URL into a web browser.
(8) Facebook did not accurately represent its compliance with the
U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework. 135
134. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Facebook Settles FTC Charges that it Deceived
Consumers by Failing to Keep Privacy Promises (Nov. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/1 I/privacysettlement.shtm [hereinafter Facebook Settlement].
135. Id.; Lesley Fair, The FTC's Settlement with Facebook: Where Facebook Went
Wrong, ON GUARD ONLINE (Nov. 29, 2011), http://onguardonline.gov/blog/ftc's-settlement-
facebook-where-facebook-went-wrong. The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework is an
international effort to coordinate privacy protection standards. For more information, see
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Several elements of the settlement agreement warrant examination. First, the
number of claims that the FTC felt comfortable pursuing against Facebook
demonstrates the volume of problematic practices in which the company
engaged. One can only guess at how many practices Facebook engages in that
would trouble consumers but that do not rise to the level of unfairness or
deception. Moreover, the number of claims and their scope-covering user
deactivation, application privacy, and overrides of user privacy preferences-
indicates that the FTC takes its enforcement mission seriously vis-A-vis
Facebook. As discussed above, the FTC has been frequently criticized for not
pursuing as robust of an enforcement program as it might have.136 Yet by
evincing its willingness to examine different aspects of Facebook's
architecture and privacy design, the FTC has sent a signal to private
industry, consumer advocates, and the general public that it is serious about
looking into Facebook's practices, and presumably into other companies'
practices as well.
Most of the FTC's claims in the Facebook settlement were based on the
deception prong under Section 5. The one claim based on unfairness, Claim
3, states that retroactively changing the privacy settings on user data that
users had actively selected and overriding those preferences constituted an
unfair act.'37 Of course, just because the FTC argues that the action was un-
fair does not mean that it meets the legal standard of unfairness under
Section 5; a judge or jury would need to make that determination at trial. Yet
the FTC would almost certainly not allege a claim in a complaint that it was
not confident of winning.
As discussed above, under the three elements of unfairness as articulat-
ed in Section 5(n) of the FTC Act, the FTC must demonstrate that the act or
practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers, which is
not reasonably avoidable by consumers or outweighed by other benefits. 8
Facebook's allegedly unfair practice is certainly likely to cause substantial
injury to consumers, given that data they previously designated as private
could be gathered by anyone with an Internet connection.'3 Such data, if
not properly anonymized, could be used for any number of ends (including
fraudulent financial transactions or identity theft) that could damage a con-
sumer's reputation, credit score, or privacy.
U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORr.GOV, http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg-main
018476.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
136. See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, F.T.C. Said to Be Near Facebook Privacy Deal, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 10, 2011, at B3.
137. Fair, supra note 135.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2011).
139. These types of data breaches are typically found to qualify as a substantial injury,
given that financial fraud or identity theft is likely to result. See, e.g., Thomas B. Leary,
Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Speech at the Wayne State University Law Review Symposi-
um: Unfair Practices and the Internet (June 25, 2007), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/unfairness.shtm.
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Applying the other prongs of the unfairness test, Facebook's retroactive
change was certainly not reasonably avoidable by consumers, considering
the lack of proper communication to users. Nor does there seem to be any
benefit to changing data privacy settings that would outweigh the injury to
consumers, especially absent consumer notice. Arguably, if Facebook had
announced the change to users, it could more easily rebut the unfairness
claim, but Facebook's direct contravention of user intent-without notice-
creates an air of unfairness around the entire action.
C. Post-Settlement Reactions and Future FTC Enforcement
The FTC settlement with Facebook provoked a great deal of public de-
bate. Most reactions were positive, pointing to a restatement of the FTC's
commitment to protecting consumer privacy online. 140 Others were more
measured, expressing optimism at the settlement and at the possibility of
future government enforcement, but calling for stronger privacy regulation
and consumer protection.141 A few critics-perhaps most surprisingly
Gawker-lambasted the FTC, labeling the settlement as insufficient and a
kowtow to industry.142 Although Gawker is more known as a gossip website
than a consumer privacy advocacy organization, not all of its criticisms can
be easily dismissed. It is obvious that Facebook could do more to protect
user privacy. It could require users to actively opt in to make data publicly
available or usable by Facebook in advertising. It could adopt "privacy by
design," a principle that argues for including user privacy at the design stage
of web and mobile product development, rather than as an afterthought once
the products have been designed, tested, and implemented.143 At the least,
Facebook could clearly communicate to users how it utilizes their data, what
its privacy policy actually means, and what changes it is making and why.
Yet all of these fairly obvious changes must be made by Facebook vol-
untarily, or perhaps under consumer or regulatory pressure. The FTC cannot
unilaterally enforce them upon the company; nor can the agency, as dis-
cussed above, act as freely as other agencies in regulating industry.'" But
140. See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, F.T.C. Settles Privacy Issue at Facebook, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2011, at B1.
141. See, e.g., Kurt Opsahl & Rainey Reitman, With FTC Settlement, Facebook Moves
Closer to EFF Bill of Rights for Social Network Users, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. DEEPLINKS
BLOG (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/201 1/l 1/ftc-settlement-facebook-
moves-closer-eff-bill-rights-social-network-users.
142. See, e.g., Ryan Tate, Facebook Just Played the Government, GAWKER (Nov. 29,
2011, 3:10 PM), http://gawker.com/5863493/facebook-just-played-the-government; Fix FB
Privacy Fail, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/fixprivacyfaillnoauth.php
(last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
143. See, e.g., The Role of Privacy by Design in Protecting Consumer Privacy, CTR. FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Jan. 28, 2010), https://www.cdt.org/policy/role-privacy-design-
protecting-consumer-privacy (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
144. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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unless (and until) the FTC receives greater enforcement authority from a
grant by Congress, its abilities remain limited.
The question of whether the FTC should enforce with a heavier hand
(assuming greater regulatory freedom) is an issue on which reasonable
minds will differ. Examining Facebook's current privacy policy, following
the settlement and the rollout of Facebook's Timeline feature (which dis-
plays all of a user's content on one page),'45 will illuminate whether or not
Facebook has learned any valuable lessons regarding its policies toward us-
ers and the use of FTC authority to regulate Facebook practices.
Facebook's current privacy policy can be found at the bottom of its
homepage, referred to as a "Data Use Policy."1 4 6 It contains multiple com-
ponents, including sharing procedures, information retrieval and use
policies, third-party sharing, advertising practices, policies relating to mi-
nors, and others. 147 Interestingly, the main Data Use Policy page was not
modified between September 2011-two months before the FTC settlement
was announced-and June 2012.148 Given the changes that Facebook was
required to make as a result of the settlement, it is surprising that they would
not inform users of the changes for over half a year.
One critical element of Facebook's privacy policy is the explanation of
how the site uses the information it obtains from users. In its Data Use Poli-
cy, Facebook claims:
We don't share information we receive about you with others un-
less we have:
* received your permission;
* given you notice, such as by telling you about it in this policy;
or
145. See, e.g., Jill Duffy, 12 Things You Should Know About Facebook Timeline,
PCMAG (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2393464,00.asp. One rele-
vant consideration might be the way in which Facebook implemented its Timeline feature.
Originally, users could opt in to Timeline, and once they did they would have seven days to
review their old data and delete old posts and content that they might not want to be visible to
all users. Id. By late 2012, Facebook had moved most users to Timeline, but still allowed the
seven-day curation period. See Samantha Murphy, Facebook Timeline Coming to Most Users
by the Fall, MASHABLE (July 31, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/07/31/facebook-timeline-
coming-fall/.
146. Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/ (last visit-
ed Mar. 18, 2012).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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* removed your name or any other personally identifying infor-
mation from it.149
These statements lead a reasonable consumer to believe that user data
will be shared with other parties only if a user opts in or receives notice, or
if the data being shared has been anonymized to remove sensitive infor-
mation. This is exactly the sort of statement that might lead to an unfairness
claim if demonstrably inaccurate, as it is similar to the unfairness claim
from the FTC settlement, which concerned the modification of user expecta-
tions and choices without notice.150 Presumably, a similar modification to
these "sharing standards" without notice would point toward a successful
unfairness claim.
Facebook also claims that when users click on advertisements, those
clicks are recorded anonymously. Advertisers do not know to whom their
advertisements are delivered, nor who saw or clicked on those ads."' As
with how user data is used, a violation of user expectations on these state-
ments--especially a retroactive violation, by which Facebook revealed older
user data concerning advertisements-could support an unfairness claim.
D. Privacy Audits and Public Disclosure
Examining Facebook's privacy policies for evidence of unfair acts re-
quires a certain amount of supposition. In part, this is because of the difficult
standards of unfairness; it also stems from Facebook's opacity concerning
how it uses the data it collects from users. Put simply, Facebook's history of
obfuscation and misleading statements suggests that one cannot take the
company at its word-especially when that word is expressed in a privacy
policy or a press release concerning Facebook's privacy practices. The rec-
ord of controversies, campaigns, and cases have so tarnished Facebook's
public image on privacy that a reasonable consumer will likely be skeptical
of Facebook's privacy promises.'
Whether one is confident that the FTC will be keeping a close eye on
Facebook in the near future depends on one's opinion on the efficacy of pri-
149. Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-
info#howweuse (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
150. Facebook Settlement, supra note 134.
151. Data Use Policy, supra note 149.
152. In some instances, user skepticism about Facebook's privacy settings may in fact
lead to "false alarms" about privacy violations. See, e.g., Colleen Taylor, Update: Facebook
Confirms No Private Messages Appearing on Timeline. They're Old Wall Posts,
TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 24, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/09/24/reports-facebook-users-
seeing-private-messages-pre-2009-showing-up-on-timelines-as-posted-by-friends/ (describing
how some users thought that private messages were being posted on user profiles, but in actu-
ality they were merely old public posts). See also danah boyd, Keynote Speech at World Wide
Web Conference 2010: Privacy and Publicity in the Context of Big Data (Apr. 29, 2010),
available at http://www.danah.org/papers/talks/2010/WWW2010.html (discussing Face-
book's privacy hiccups).
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vacy audits. A third-party examiner will conduct the audits for the next
twenty years. This long time period points to both the serious nature of the
violations and the FTC's commitment to holding Facebook accountable. But
the results of the audits will probably not be made public,15 3 and it will be
difficult to know whether Facebook is actually serious about its commitment
to privacy-despite Zuckerberg's reassuring statements.
Privacy audits are an important way to enforce a settlement and encour-
age "good behavior" from a company; they serve as a sort of long-term
probationary period. But the audits-like the investigations-are not public,
and thus their deterrent effect is not as large as it could be. The FTC could
increase the awareness of the audits and their effectiveness by describing the
general audit process via a publicly posted, electronically available press
release. 154 This would give the audits more force and would signal to con-
sumers that their privacy is being protected, and a press release could be
written to preserve the confidentiality of any private information or trade
secrets that an audited company needs to protect. The current audit system,
in which audits seem to be less important in deterring bad consumer practic-
es than the actual complaints and settlements, does not adequately
demonstrate the FTC's commitment to privacy protection.155 Because audits
are not made public or even discussed beyond the initial announcement in a
consent decree, they seem obscure to the general public.
There is something unsatisfying about the result in the latest skirmish
between the FTC and Facebook. Since the settlement mainly provides for
increased future oversight, it is hard to proclaim it a regulatory victory. Much
will depend on the vigor and effectiveness of the privacy audits and the FTC's
response. Certainly, public disclosure on the results of those audits would
pressure Facebook into following both the letter and the spirit of privacy
law. There are strong reasons for keeping audit results confidential-most
153. In October 2012, the Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC") obtained the
initial privacy assessment submitted to the FTC by Google under the terms of the consent
degree via a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request. See Letter from Dione J. Stearns,
Assistant Gen. Counsel, Fed. Trade Comm'n, to Ginger McCall, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. (Sept.
25, 2012), available at http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/googlebuzz/FTC-Initial-Assessment-09-26-
12.pdf. However, the FTC invoked several FOIA exceptions in release of the letter, which
EPIC planned to challenge. See Federal Trade Commission, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR.,
http://epic.org/privacy/internet/ftc/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). Relying upon FOIA requests
in order to obtain the results of privacy audits is an inefficient method of raising public aware-
ness, as citizens, journalists, and non-profit organizations would need to actively seek the
audits from the FTC, rather than relying upon the agency itself to release them.
154. The Commission already makes most of its consent decrees and settlements public-
ly available via its online Newsroom. Newsroom, FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/
opalindex.shtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
155. For example, there is the suggestion that Google violated its own settlement agree-
ment when privacy setting circumventions in Apple's Safari browser were discovered. See,
e.g., James Temple, FTC Chief Weighs in on Online Privacy Report, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 27,
2012, at DI. If so, the privacy audits did not preclude the agency from engaging in practices
prohibited by the FTC settlement.
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obviously, to respect the privacy rights of Facebook itself. But in order to
convince consumers that it is serious about preventing Facebook from once
again acting unfairly, the FTC needs to show that it has taken tangible action
in regulating the social network.
V. TWITTER: MICROBLOGGING AND
INTERACTION ON AN UNPRECEDENTED SCALE
A. 140 Characters or Fewer
Twitter, the microblogging social network service, has not achieved the
high traffic or pervasiveness of Facebook and Google for most Internet us-
ers, in part due to its relative youth compared to the older companies.
Currently, the site is ranked number eight on the Alexa global ranking.15 6
Unlike Facebook and Google, Twitter provides one service: the ability to
microblog by posting updates to one's feed with a maximum length of 140
characters. Another key difference lies in the ways in which individuals can
access and interact via the service; Twitter users can post updates and read
others' Tweets by using the website interface, or use third-party clients (both
official and unofficial). Google and Facebook, by contrast, get much of their
traffic through their main websites.
Twitter's main source of data comes from its users, who update their
Twitter feeds with a vast amount of information. Twitter feeds can contain
geolocation, user-created photos and videos, and information on an individ-
ual's preferences and brand loyalties. Twitter users also select other users to
follow on the service, thereby providing Twitter with information about
which celebrities and public figures they find interesting, and which users
are within their personal social networks.
Because Twitter is a younger service than Facebook and Google, it has
had fewer years to experience and rebound from privacy setbacks and con-
troversies. Twitter's privacy problems have not been as prominent as the
Google Buzz or Facebook Beacon episodes, but the FTC announced its
Twitter settlement prior to announcing the Google and Facebook settle-
ments.'5 7 The Twitter settlement was finalized in March 201 158 This
Section investigates the settlement and examines Twitter's recent privacy
lapses to determine the necessity of current and future enforcement.
156. Twitter.com Site Info, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/twitter.com (last vis-
ited Oct. 21, 2012).
157. The FTC announced its proposed settlement with Twitter in June 2010. See Press
Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Twitter Settles Charges that it Failed to Protect Consumers'
Personal Information; Company Will Establish Independently Audited Information Security
Program (June 24, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/06/twitter.shtm.
158. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Accepts Final Settlement with Twitter for
Failure to Safeguard Personal Information (Mar. 11, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/2011/03/twitter.shtm.
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B. The FTC's Complaint and Final Settlement
1. The Initial Complaint
The FTC alleged two counts of deceptive practices against Twitter in its
complaint:' (1) that Twitter did not use reasonable and appropriate security
measures to prevent unauthorized access to nonpublic information, despite
its security claims; and (2) that Twitter did not use reasonable and appropri-
ate security measures to honor the privacy choices made by users, again in
contrast to its assertions.160 The complaint included evidence of unauthor-
ized account use by intruders in order to demonstrate how Twitter falsely
made claims about its security practices.161 On multiple occasions between
January and May 2009, intruders were allegedly able to reset user pass-
words based on access to Twitter employee accounts. As a result, intruders
were able to modify accounts and gain access to nonpublic information.162
The FTC used its deception power to seek an enforcement action, claiming
that Twitter's security was far less robust than asserted. If Twitter had taken
security steps akin to what it stated on its website, the FTC argued, the in-
truders would not have been able to so easily gain access to user accounts.163
While the Twitter settlement is commendable for its censure of inade-
quate security practices, it also illustrates the limitations of relying upon the
deception prong of Section 5 to regulate website practices. Though the vio-
lations described in the complaint specifically concern security rather than
privacy, they hold implications for user privacy since the security breach
resulted in easy access to user data. The FTC had to rely upon security
breaches caused by third parties that exposed vulnerabilities, rather than
Twitter's own actions. It did not regulate typical Twitter practices, but in-
stead reacted to a shortcoming demonstrated by unauthorized access.
Alternatively, the FTC could have brought an unfairness claim against
Twitter for its business practices in this case. As discussed supra in Part II, a
three-factor test applies in determining whether a business practice or act is
unfair: the act or practice must cause or be likely to cause (1) substantial
injury to consumers which is (2) not reasonably avoidable by consumers or
(3) outweighed by other benefits." In this case, the practice-Twitter's in-
ternally inadequate security measures-is certainly likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers, if identifiable private information was dis-
closed to third parties without user consent. Since Twitter users can
exchange direct private messages with other users and post nonpublic
159. Twitter, Inc., Docket No. C-4316, File No. 0923093, at 5 (Fed. Trade Comm'n June
24, 2010) (complaint), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923093/100624twittercmpt.pdf.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 3-5.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2011).
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tweets, some sensitive user information must have been disclosed as a result
of Twitter's inadequate practices.
Twitter's practices also meet the second and third prongs of the unfair-
ness test. Consumers could not have avoided the inadequate security
practices that Twitter employed, because it would have been impossible for
any consumer to know the exact contours of Twitter's internal security.
There also was no clear benefit to consumers based on Twitter's practices,
much less a benefit that outweighed Twitter's practices; the lack of rigorous
security could only prove detrimental to users. Therefore, all three elements
of the current unfairness test seem to be met.
It is unclear why the FTC did not allege an unfairness claim against
Twitter. As discussed supra, the agency seems to prefer to litigate under the
deception prong of Section 5 rather than the unfairness prong, in part be-
cause of the clearer standards of deception and the more robust legal
precedent. Of course, to some extent this is a vicious cycle: if the agency
prefers to use deception rather than unfairness in cases, the standards of un-
fairness will remain fuzzier than those of deception, and there will be less
unfairness case law to rely upon. While Sears Holdings and the more recent
case FTC v. Neovi, Inc. point to a renewed commitment to unfairness litiga-
tion by the agency, in the online privacy realm there are distressingly few
recent examples of successful unfairness cases.'16
2. The Final Settlement
The final FTC settlement with Twitter did not materially alter any of the
pleadings from the initial complaint.166 Under the terms of the settlement,
Twitter cannot mislead consumers regarding its security practices for twenty
years, and must establish a comprehensive information security program, to
be audited every other year for ten years.167
The effectiveness of privacy audits notwithstanding, this particular case
in large part mirrors the Facebook analysis.168 The Twitter complaint and
order are narrower in scope than the Facebook order, perhaps because this
complaint was the first to be brought against a social network and paved the
way for future, broader enforcement actions against Facebook and
165. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). In Neovi,
the FTC used its unfairness authority to bring a case against Qchex, a service that allowed for
automated creation and mailing of checks. Qchex was governed by Neovi, Inc. The FTC al-
leged that Qchex's unsecured systems led to widespread fraud and were unfair as defined by
Section 5. The use of the unfairness prong in a case that concerned over $400 million in
fraudulent checks illustrates that the FTC was willing to use its lesser-exercised unfairness
authority in a high-profile case. See id.
166. Twitter, Inc., Docket No. C-4316, File No. 0923093 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Mar. 2,
2011) (decision and order), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923093/11031 Itwitterdo.pdf.
167. See id.; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note 158.
168. See supra Part IV.
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Google.169 Since in recent decades the agency has taken a conservative ap-
proach to its mission, the order's narrowness compared to subsequent
actions makes sense; to some extent, the Twitter action "opened the door" to
later cases.17 0 The final settlement did not provide for monetary damages,"'
which could have been helpful in deterring future conduct by Twitter that
might violate Section 5. Nonetheless, the public nature of the settlement
sent a clear message to other web service operators.'72
C. Twitter Post-Settlement: Mobile Privacy and Current Policies
1. We Know Who Your Friends Are
In the wake of the settlement, Twitter has reformed its practices con-
cerning internal security,"' but the company has remained in the spotlight
for privacy issues. In February 2012, several news outlets reported that Twit-
ter's smartphone app retained user data without explicitly informing users
about this practice.174 When users tapped on the "Find Friends" button with-
in the app, Twitter would download the entire address book from the phone,
storing the data for eighteen months. 7 1
Crucially, Twitter did not blatantly violate its terms of service by retain-
ing its users' address book data. 7 6 The terms apparently indicated that
certain types of data would be retained for eighteen months, but did not state
explicitly which data would be stored, or that Twitter would download users'
address books in this way.'77 Twitter also provided users the ability to re-
move their personal address book data from Twitter's servers. 7 1
Because Twitter did disclose that some data would be retained for
eighteen months, but used vague language about how it decided what data
would be stored for that length of time, the FTC would likely be unable to
pursue a claim under the deception prong of Section 5. Strictly speaking,
Twitter did not deceive its users; it merely did not explain its practices as
clearly as it could have. Yet the company's actions-and its lack of clarity
surrounding its practices until an issue publicly materialized-demonstrate
169. See discussion supra Parts II-Ill.
170. See discussion supra Part IV.B-C.
171. Twitter, Inc., Docket No. C-4316, File No. 0923093 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Mar. 2,
2011) (decision and order), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923093/11031Itwitterdo.pdf.
172. See, e.g., Caroline McCarthy, Twitter, FTC Reach Agreement on Security, CNET
(June 24, 2010, 11:31 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-20008743-36.html.
173. See, e.g., id.
174. See, e.g., David Sarno, Twitter Stores Full iPhone Contact List for 18 Months, After
Scan, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2012), http://articies.latimes.com/2012/feb/14/business/la-fi-tn-
twitter-contacts-20120214.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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at best carelessness, and at worst a derogation of responsibilities under the
March 2011 settlement.
Because the company's privacy policy statements appear to forestall
any potential deception claim, unfairness would seem to be the sole meth-
od of FTC regulation and enforcement of this particular Twitter practice.
Under a traditional unfairness analysis, the FTC would need to demon-
strate that Twitter's practices harmed or were likely to harm consumers.
Without further investigation into how Twitter collected address book data
and whether it transmitted that data to third parties, it is impossible to de-
termine if the first prong of the unfairness test has been met. Under the
terms of the consent agreement, however, one could argue that Twitter vio-
lated its preexisting obligations to the FTC. For example, the FTC consent
decree prevents Twitter from misrepresenting "in any manner, expressly or
by implication, the extent to which respondent maintains and protects the
security, privacy, confidentiality, or integrity of any nonpublic consumer
information."'79
The second and third elements of the unfairness test are more easily
met. Consumers had no way to avoid Twitter's collection of data, and the
company itself admitted that the policy was not clear.'8 0 It is theoretically
true that consumers could have avoided using Twitter's smartphone mobile
app, thereby preventing Twitter from retaining address book data. Yet it was
not evident to Twitter users that the app retained any data at all. Thus, there
would be no apparent reason for consumers to avoid using the app, given
that the behavior they would be attempting to avoid was not obvious.",
Finally, there does not seem to be any benefit to consumers as
a result of Twitter's address book retention policy. Users already have the data
that Twitter retains on their phones, and, should they choose to rerun the
Find Friends tool, Twitter would not need to retain any data in order to
allow the Find Friends tool to operate. Overall, the mobile privacy contro-
versy would at least seem to warrant further FTC investigation. Yet the
current understanding of the unfairness standard might cramp the agency's
ability to investigate, even under the broad terms of the consent decree.
2. Twitter's Current Privacy Policy
In the aftermath of the address book controversy, Twitter pledged to
modify its privacy policy to more clearly establish what data was being col-
179. Twitter, Inc., Docket No. C-4316, File No. 0923093, at 2 (Fed. Trade Comm'n
Mar. 2, 2011) (decision and order), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923093/11031Itwitterdo.pdf.
180. See, e.g., Sarno, supra note 174.
181. The differences between mobile and desktop applications may also demonstrate
that consumer expectations vary depending on the type of device used. See Angelique Carson,
At FTC Event, Experts Agree There's Work to Be Done on Mobile Privacy Disclosures, INT'L
Ass'N OF PRIVACY PROFESSIONALS (June 18, 2012), https://www.privacyassociation.org/
publications/2012_06 14_atftceventexperts-agree-thereswork_to_be_done onmobile.
[Vol. I9:163
Broadening Unfairness Regulation for a New Era
lected from users, how such data was being collected, and for how long. 82
At present, Twitter does not claim to store any personal data as part of the
"Log Data" that it retains for eighteen months; rather, Log Data consists of
information regarding the devices and services used to access the site, rather
than personal information about the user. 183
Twitter also states in its privacy policy that it dictates how third parties
use personal data. 184 As a result, a user could reasonably assume that any
data transferred to a third party would be treated in largely the same way
that Twitter would treat such data. If that assumption turned out to be incor-
rect, a case could certainly be made for unfairness enforcement against
Twitter and any third parties that received Twitter user data.
D. Openness and Certainty in the Twittersphere
Much of the analysis of Twitter's practices and the possibility of claims
remain suppositional. As with Facebook and Google, it can be frustratingly
difficult to parse what Twitter says it does and reconcile those claims with
the scandal du jour. Twitter's attempt to express its privacy policy in con-
cise, plain English deserves credit for avoiding lengthy legalese. Yet by
stripping down its privacy policy, Twitter has made it difficult to determine
exactly what it does with user data-obfuscating the transparency that the
clear language was designed to effect.
Because the FTC does not publicize the results of privacy audits or its
investigations, consumer advocates can only hope that the agency has been
addressing its troubling practices vigorously. The Twitter settlement agree-
ment-although not as broad as Facebook's-certainly provides the FTC
with the tools to ensure that inappropriate practices, like the address book
data retention issue, receive full attention from the agency. Whether the
agency actually uses the tools at its disposal to investigate Twitter-or other
technology companies, for that matter-will be difficult to determine in the
immediate future.
CONCLUSION: BROADER UNFAIRNESS AUTHORITY ON THE HORIZON?
The three examples of Google, Facebook, and Twitter demonstrate the
information asymmetries in the user/website relationship pertaining to
online privacy. Much of the analysis requires assumptions about site practic-
es and close readings of privacy policy language that may or may not
accurately describe the actual practices of websites.
Years of self-regulation have failed to create an industry standard of pri-
vacy by design, opt-in sharing provisions, or other principles that would
182. See, e.g., Sarno, supra note 174.
183. Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/privacy (last visited Mar.
31, 2012).
184. Id.
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more effectively protect consumers. Web service providers consistently re-
main in the news for breaches involving user data.' The status quo has
been plainly insufficient in protecting user privacy, just as the current regula-
tory tools available to the FTC have been inadequate to ensure that
companies are deterred from violating reasonable user privacy expectations.
In early 2012, President Obama announced a renewed government in-
terest in protecting consumer privacy.186 The President argued "American
consumers can't wait any longer for clear rules of the road that ensure their
personal information is safe online."' He also claimed that "[b]y following
[the proposed] blueprint, companies, consumer advocates and policy makers
can help protect consumers and ensure the Internet remains a platform for
innovation and economic growth."'88
The President's statement prioritizes the use of clear rules, but does not
place those rules in opposition to innovation or the growth of an important
economic sector. By arguing that government and industry can work coop-
eratively, rather than in adversarial debate, the President has signaled that
further regulation need not take the form of litigation. The FTC has histori-
cally employed policy levers to achieve its regulatory goals, and the White
House report on its proposed Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights relies upon
and encourages Congress to expand the FTC's regulatory authority.189 As
contemplated by the White House, Congress would expand that authority in
185. In October 2012, for example, Bogomil Shopov, a Bulgarian blogger and activist
announced that he had purchased a database of Facebook users' names, user IDs, and email
addresses for five dollars. While some or most of that data was publicly available, Shopov
claimed that his ability to buy so much valuable user data demonstrated Facebook's failure to
securely protect its users' data. See Andy Greenberg, Facebook Investigating How Bulgarian
Man Bought 1.1 Million Users' Email Addresses for Five Dollars, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2012,4:39
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/10/25/facebook-investigating-how-
bulgarian-man-bought-I - I-million-users-email-addresses-for-five-dollars/.
186. Edward Wyatt, White House, Consumers in Mind, Offers Online Privacy Guide-
lines, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2012, at Bl.
187. Press Release, White House, We Can't Wait: Obama Administration Unveils Blue-
print for a "Privacy Bill of Rights" to Protect Consumers Online (Feb. 23, 2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/23/we-can-t-wait-obama-administration-
unveils-blueprint-privacy-bill-rights.
188. Id.
189. WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAME-
wORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL
ECONOMY 36 (2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-
final.pdf [hereinafter CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY]. In the report, the White House emphasized
the importance of transparency, respect for context, security, access and accuracy, focused
collection, and accountability as companies continue to collect information from consumers.
See Press Release, White House, supra note 187. The White House also specifically contem-
plated strong FTC enforcement in order to further these consumer goals, either through
existing statutory grants or through expansion of the FrC's regulatory power. See CONSUMER
DATA PRIVACY, supra, at 36.
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order to uphold the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, using both its decep-
tion and unfairness regulatory powers.'"
The White House's express identification of unfairness as appropriate in
this space provides an acknowledgement from the government that unfair-
ness enforcement can and should be used to regulate websites' privacy
practices. By using the unfairness doctrine as a regulatory strategy, the FTC
can extend its reach and create a more specific understanding of what un-
fairness means. In its March 2012 final report on protecting consumer
privacy, the FTC expressly acknowledged that increased regulation of per-
sonal privacy rights would require use of the unfairness prong.19 ' It remains
to be seen exactly how the FTC will create and define a new or revised ap-
proach to unfairness regulation for online privacy, but its commitment is a
promising sign. 19 2 The September 2012 announcement that the FTC has
used its unfairness authority to file complaints against a software company
and seven rent-to-own franchises for privacy invasions demonstrates that the
agency is ready to use its unfairness authority more actively to pursue viola-
tions of personal privacy. 193
In his dissenting statement to the report, FTC Commissioner J. Thomas
Rosch argued that the Commission's report would require a vastly expanded
understanding of the unfairness prong.'94 He disagreed with the proposal to
expand the unfairness authority, claiming "'Unfairness' is an elastic and
elusive concept. What is 'unfair' is in the eye of the beholder."95 Rosch
identified this supposed lack of specificity as contrary to the motivation be-
hind the 1980s policy statements.196
190. Id. at 27 n.32.
191. FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 73 (2012).
192. In the report, the FTC called for Do No Track Legislation, indicating that it under-
stood the importance of consumer choice with regard to tracking. See Tanzina Vega &
Edward Wyatt, U.S. Agency Seeks Tougher Consumer Privacy Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27,
2012, at Al.
193. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Halts Computer Spying (Sept. 25,
2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/09/designware.shtm. In the case, a software
firm, DesignerWare, created software that allowed the rent-to-own companies to spy on their
customers without disclosure or consent after renting laptops. The software allowed the com-
panies to track consumers via webcams, geolocation, and keystroke monitoring. In the
complaint, the Commission asserted that DesignerWare's conduct was unfair because it
caused or was likely to cause substantial injury to consumers without the possibility of avoid-
ance or a countervailing benefit. DesignerWare, LLC, File No. 1123151, at 5, 7 (Fed.
Trade Comm'n 2012) (complaint), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1123151/designerware/
120925designerwarecmpt.pdf. The traditional definition of unfairness was not expanded in
this case, but merely applied to a data privacy case, demonstrating the FTC's ability and will-
ingness to use its unfairness authority against privacy invasions.
194. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 191, at C-3.
195. Id.
196. Id. at C-4.
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Rosch's argument that the FTC claimed it would not rely upon intan-
gible harm in an unfairness case is accurate,197 but his reliance upon a
policy statement that was crafted as a response to political pressure is sur-
prising and somewhat misguided. It is certainly true that the FTC report
contemplates a shift-perhaps even a radical shift-in the agency's position
on its own unfairness authority. Yet the policy statements were arguably an
equally radical shift at the time they were written, created out of political
necessity. Similarly, the new approach contemplated by the report comes in
response to a new technological reality. While the policy statements may
have been expedient for their era, they provide an inadequate regulatory
tool for current business practices. The FTC's willingness to acknowledge
that times have changed proves the agency's awareness that the current
digital environment requires a modern approach to consumer protection.
As a result, consumers may still have hope that their data may one day
soon be used fairly.
197. Id.
[Vol. 19:163
